Abstract

Social consciousness – which amounts to something like ‘being woke’ – is a cognitive sensitivity to social injustices in one’s local environment and broader culture. From here, social consciousness can be accounted for in a variety of ways. Recently, it’s been suggested that we can understand social consciousness through the lens of moral encroachment. To be social consciousness, on this account, is to believe in accordance with the dictates of moral encroachment. After considering this account, I raise a few worries: it involves controversial theoretical commitments, entails unintuitive verdicts in important cases, and appears to be too demanding. In light of these worries, I develop a new account of social consciousness as a morally virtuous cognitive disposition that manifests primarily in certain doxastic states. I argue that we should favor the virtue account because it weathers the worries that trouble the encroachment account, and better captures several important features of social consciousness.