The Reasonableness of Agnosticism

Religious Studies 20 (4):627 - 630 (1984)
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Abstract

Agnostics often hold that, since there is not a clear preponderance of evidence either in favour of theistic belief or against it, their position of suspended belief is more rational than either theism or atheism. I would like to examine an objection raised recently by Clement Dore against the agnostic's reasoning on this matter

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