Cognitive Penetrability and High‐Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):469-486 (2015)
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Abstract

There has been a recent surge in interest in two questions concerning the nature of perceptual experience; viz. the question of whether perceptual experience is sometimes cognitively penetrated and that of whether high-level properties are presented in perceptual experience. Only rarely have thinkers been concerned with the question of whether the two phenomena are interestingly related. Here we argue that the two phenomena are not related in any interesting way. We argue further that this lack of an interesting connection between the two phenomena has potentially devastating consequences for naïve realism. Finally, we consider the possibility of a disunified view of experience that takes perceptual experience to be a matter of both being directly perceptually related to mind-independent objects and property instances as well as consciously representing these entities

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Author Profiles

Bartek Chomanski
Adam Mickiewicz University
Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

Citations of this work

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Expert Knowledge by Perception.Madeleine Ransom - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (3):309-335.

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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.

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