Punishment and Moral Sentiments

Review of Metaphysics 66 (2):281-93 (2012)
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Abstract

Adam Smith's theory of punishment is rarely explored. This article examines his understanding of punishment in light of his theory of moral sentiments. My aim is to show how he is neither a retributivist or deterrence advocate, but instead defends a more unified theory of punishment bringing different penal goals together in a new framework.

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Thom Brooks
Durham University

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