Abstract

The paper aimed to reconstruct Twardowski's approach to the problem of free will and his analyses of the consequences of various solutions to this problem in ethics and criminal law. According to Twardowski, if we understand ‘free will’ as the possibility of making resolutions other than actually made, then (most probably) nobody has free will. Our resolutions are determined by a set of mental dispositions (character) and incentives that activate these dispositions. However, the existence of freedom of will such understood is not a necessary condition for the correct functioning of ethical systems or criminal law. On the contrary, ethical systems and criminal law seem to assume that at least some of our resolutions are determined by our relatively stable dispositions. Only then can these resolutions and the actions that follow them be ascribed to certain agents. Twardowski's views on free will are presented here in the context of the metaphilosophical positions of the Lvov–Warsaw School, the central European branch of analytic philosophy. His position is also juxtaposed with Brentano's view of free will and Łukasiewicz's approach to the determinism/indeterminism debate. This juxtaposition illustrates the variety of philosophical positions and the diversity of the metaphilosophical toolkit applied in early analytic philosophy.