Hinge propositions and epistemic justification

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):285–287 (2007)
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Abstract

Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions, such as there is an external world. In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it.

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How to defeat belief in the external world.Allan Hazlett - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.

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