Abstract

The author of Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions discusses three major fields of objection against his outline of an evolutionary theory of public and international law. In the first part he discusses problems of action theory. There are at issue, first, the role of negation and moral resentment for the constitution of a normatively relevant social praxis, then the emergence of social systems within and from the context of the life-world, and the relation of revolutionary and gradual learning processes. The second part discusses the relation of his theory to postcolonial and feminist studies. Finally, the debate centers in part III on the dialectic of Enlightenment. The problem of alienation and negativity is at stake, closely related to the negative aesthetic of law and the intertwinement of repression and emancipation within the legal form. In the end, it is an open question if we today still can rely on the negative aesthetic and hidden utopian form of law, or if we have already fallen back to constitutional kitsch and façade