St. Thomas and Modern Natural Science: Reconsidering Abstraction from Matter

In Carlos A. Casanova & Ignacio Serrano del Pozo (eds.), Cognoscens in Actu Est Ipsum Cognitum in Actu: Sobre Los Tipos y Grados de Conocimiento,. pp. 433–471 (2018)
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Abstract

The realism grounding St. Thomas Aquinas’s pre-modern natural science defends the reception of similitudes of the forms of things known by abstraction. Modern natural science challenges this abstractio- nist account by recasting «form» in the leading role of principle of intelligibility—instead of forms, modern science discovers laws. Thomistic realism is prima facie incompatible with this account. Following Charles De Koninck, this essay outlines a rapprochement between the epistemology of pre-modern, Thomistic natural science and its modern successor. I argue that natural forms are noetic limits towards which physical laws tend, and our grasp of this tendency uses a mode of knowledge comparable to what St. Thomas termed universal in repraesentando.

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John G. Brungardt
Pontifical Catholic University of Chile

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