Information as the Basis for Representation

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 32:8-13 (1998)
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Abstract

The article presents a proposal to use the notion of information and a model of its transmission for analysis of the structure and basic functions of a sign. This is to point to the relation between information and the basic function of a sign, that is, a 'representation.' A sign is understood, in accordance with Peirce's theory, as a triadic relation of representation. One of the consequences of this theory is limitation of representation to the area of internal objects of a sign, that is, to ideal intentional objects. The relationship between a sign and the external world remains unexplained, which allows one to perceive a sign as a barrier in comprehension of the external world. A more complete justification is also required for both the relationship between object and meaning of the sign and the very arising of representation as a unity of three elements. The article analyzes the triadic relation of representation on the basis of the notion of information close to the one proposed by C.F. von Weizsacker. It is shown that representation can be understood as a specific, complex information flow. Processes of information flow determine the structure of representation as well as the relationships between the world of signs and the world beyond signs. Such approach allows one to give a more complete justification to the ability of sign systems to represent the external world.

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