Abstract

A standard view in legal and political theory is that, to a first approximation, (1) we should aim to bring about the most legitimate institutions possible to solve the problems that should be solved at the level of politics, and (2) individual people are required to follow the directives of legitimate institutions, at least insofar as those institutions have the authority to issue those directives, and insofar as other considerations are nearly equal.1 On this standard view, the philosophical analysis of institutional legitimacy can appear to be of the utmost importance because it can seem to answer the most important questions about what we should actually do in the realm of law and politics, and because it may also seem to serve as the crucial bridge between ideal and nonideal theory, at least if institutional legitimacy is analyzed as it often is as a matter of doing well enough along dimensions that are familiar from ideal APA NEWSLETTER | PHILOSOPHY AND LAW theory (e.g., ideal justice, universal consent, respecting basic rights, social welfare maximization, and so on). In what follows I identify a number of possible counterexamples to this standard view, which suggest that there may be no straightforward connection between institutional legitimacy and facts about what reasons, rights, and duties we actually have, and what institutions we should actually try to bring about, contrary to what the standard view assumes.