Abstract

The chief purpose of Peter Kivy’s latest book, which is written in his familiar civilised, leisurely manner, is to recommend to philosophers of art the pursuit of differences—the looking for differences—amongst the fine arts. This recommendation is not advanced in virtue of scepticism about the possibility of a unitary theory of the various art forms or conviction of the impossibility of a definition of the concept of fine art or a denial that the achievement of such a definition would be of any real importance. Rather, Kivy argues that the pursuit of sameness across the arts has led time and time again to a misrepresentation of the nature of one or more of the arts through their assimilation to a supposed paradigmatic art form or the imposition on them of a favoured conception of the essence of art. Accordingly, the first chapter of the book sketches the history of aesthetic theory from the eighteenth to the first part of the twentieth century and represents it as dominated by the attempt to fit the recalcitrant art of absolute music into what was taken to be the essential nature of art or to replace this conception by one appropriate to music, neither attempt being successful. And the second chapter brings us up to the present through a critical examination of the Wittgensteinian repudiation of the traditional task of defining art—very familiar territory—and Arthur Danto’s continuation of the traditional task but with a radical change in the idea of the kind of property that binds the arts together. Kivy’s claim is not just that the pursuit of sameness has had deleterious effects in the past but that at the present time the task of defining the idea of a work of art still dominates discussion and “discourage[s] philosophers from the equally interesting task of studying the arts in their particularity”. The remaining five chapters of his book are case studies intended to act as an antidote to the obsession with the pursuit of sameness.