Abstract

The connection between fear, law and the state is a topic that is given particular attention in times of social insecurity. Some approximations are explored here under the notion of fear constitutions. We are equal in fear of one another, which is why fear can be understood as a condition of modern constitutions. However, the social contract does not lead to freedom from fear, but rather fear shifts; the legal subjects remain subjects of fear, in relation to one another, but in particular towards that multiple artificial person which the state comes to embody as it takes on a life of its own. The degree of fear varies with the degree of unpredictability and indeterminacy of executive action. State measures against terrorism or against the pandemic are often an unpredictable response to an unknown danger and are therefore at the same time both an expression of fear and its trigger. It would be helpful if there was a clear distinction between sensible and unreasonable, functional and dysfunctional forms of fear. Freud tried to provide criteria with his concept of neurotic fear, a concept that has been taken up in political and legal philosophy. However, the concept is obscure and cannot be used without normative specifications.