Abstract

This dissertation is a systematic treatise on the nature of theories. It accounts for theories as natural complexes; kinds of theories; kinds of constituents of theories, and kinds of constituents included in pure descriptive, pure analytic, and synthetic-analytic theories. ;The concept of "theory" is derived from Justus Buchler's metaphysics of natural complexes which is ontologically neutral. Alfred Schutz's phenomenological theory of social action, Talcott Parsons' theory of social action, George Herbert Mead's symbolic interactionism and Buchler's "theory of judgement," are used to synthesize a new systematic perspective of theory production, analysis, and evaluation. ;Theory construction and evaluation are understood both as processes of judgment and communication. Theory construction is viewed as communicative act in which constructs are interpreted and expressed as meanings of complexes. Theory evaluation is conducted from the perspective of how a theorist used constructs to interpret and express his meanings of complexes. ;Methods are provided for analyzing theories for their constituents or traits. Some of these traits are first-order and second-order constructs, definitions, and definiens. Other identifiable traits are manifest and latent structures, such as orders of categorical priority, orders of non-categorical priority, orders of paradigmatic priority, founding, superaltern and subaltern paradigms, and orders of ontological priority. ;New concepts and methods are established for use in philosophy of science, hermeneutics, philosophy of language, and theory analysis. Criteria and methods are provided for identifying and evaluating definitions, definiens, first-order constructs, second-order constructs; analytic and descriptive terms; analytic and descriptive propositions; and analytic and descriptive theories. The methods enable an analyst to determine whether constituents of theories are subjectively, objectively and/or inter-subjectively meaning-adequate or meaning-inadequate. They also allow the analyst to determine whether constituents of a theory are subjectively, objectively and/or phenomenologically reliable or unreliable, logically adequate or inadequate, and scientifically adequate or inadequate. The keys to understanding and evaluating a theory are shown to be second-order constructs, whose meanings are defined in a theory, and first-order constructs, whose meanings are not defined within a theory