Hegel and the Normativity of the Concept

Idealistic Studies 41 (3):161-166 (2011)
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Abstract

A lexical unit of meaning, or the concept, involves not just two moments, the rule and the following of the rule, but two reciprocally dependent moments. I argue that this links meaning to value. As a reciprocal relation, truth as normative is constituted by what Hegel calls ethical substance, which exists only between more than one consciousness, or, as Hegel would say, moments of consciousness. I read these two moments as the two shapes of consciousness that Hegel calls the master and slave in the Phenomenology of Spirit

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Victoria I. Burke
Ryerson University

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