Do the Weak Have a Right to Fight the Strong? Moral Absolutes and the Probability of Success

Studia Philosophiae Christianae 60 (2):35-50 (2024)
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Abstract

The jus ad bellum requirement of the probability of success can be perceived as an unjust requirement which prohibits the weaker side of a potential or actual military conflict from committing itself to organized violence, even to defend and protect its own survival. This view of the probability of success as an unjust requirement, however, need only be held if: (1) the goal of the weaker state is survival itself. In cases when (1) is true, the requirement should be considered void. On the other hand, if: (2) survival is not considered an overriding factor, then the requirement stands. This paper explores the latter position using the example of the famous Melian Dialogue from Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, and applies it to the question of Ukraine’s right to war and their government’s possible moral obligation to negotiate in their current defensive war against Russia. ---------------------------------------- Received: 26/04/2024. Reviewed: 12/06/2024. Accepted: 5/11/2024.

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Stipe Buzar
Libertas International University In Zagreb

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