Abstract

ABSTRACT Broome’s target in his paper is the popular claim that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. He takes this to be the reductive claim that rationality reduces to responding correctly to reasons, which in turn he takes to entail that the property of rationality is identical to the property of responding correctly to reasons. It is this identity claim that Broome attempts to refute by showing that the properties that are supposed to be identical cannot be so because they themselves do not share all properties. In this short commentary, I shall say something about the overall structure of Broome’s argument. More specifically, I shall argue that in its current form his argument rests on a very controversial premise, but that it can be replaced with an argument that avoids it and has wider significance. I shall also question the way Broome deals with the so-called Kantian argument against his own argument. Finally, I shall sketch an alternative view of rationality, which agrees with Broome that it supervenes on the mind, but disagrees with him on the question of whether it itself is a purely mental property.