Knowing that I am thinking

In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2011)
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Abstract

Soc. …I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken,—I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you? Theaet. I agree.

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Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

The nature of epistemic feelings.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
Recollection, perception, imagination.Alex Byrne - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148:15 - 26.
Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content.David Pitt - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 141-173.
Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.

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References found in this work

A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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