Against Lewis on ‘Desire as Belief’

Polish Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):17-28 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory of desire he calls ‘Desire as Belief’. Lewis’ critics generally accept that his argument is sound and focus instead on trying to show that its implications are less severe than appearances suggest. In this paper I argue that Lewis’ argument is unsound. I show that it rests on an essential assumption that can be straightforwardly proven false using ideas and principles to which Lewis is himself committed.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Harmony, purity, truth.Graham Oddie - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):451-472.
Absolute value as belief.Steven Daskal - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):221 - 229.
The Argument from Desire.Robert Holyer - 1988 - Faith and Philosophy 5 (1):61-71.
Desire Beyond Belief.Philip Pettit & Alan Hájek - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):77-92.
Lewisian quidditism, humility, and diffidence.Benjamin L. Curtis - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3081-3099.
Decision Theory After Lewis.John Collins - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer, A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 446-458.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-11-02

Downloads
728 (#36,818)

6 months
116 (#51,228)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Douglas Ian Campbell
University of Canterbury

Citations of this work

Expressing Moral Belief.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references