What does rationality have to do with psychological causation? Propositional attitudes as mechanisms and as control variables

In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 137--149 (2009)
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Citations of this work

Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jaspers on explaining and understanding in psychiatry.Christoph Hoerl - 2013 - In Thomas Fuchs & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), One Hundred Years of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-120.
Explanation in psychiatry.Dominic Murphy - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):602-610.

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