The identity theory of truth

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
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Abstract

is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the truth, then we inevitably fail to capture the reality they are about and thus fall short of the truth we aim at. An identity theory is designed to overcome this suspicion.

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Stewart Candlish
University of Western Australia

Citations of this work

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Wherefore the Failure of Private Ostension?George Wrisley - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):483 - 498.
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References found in this work

Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

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