Content Relativism and Semantic Blindness

In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel, Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 265-86 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

For some relativists some of the time the evidence for their view is a puzzling data pattern: On the one hand, there's evidence that the terms in question exhibit some kind of content stability across contexts. On the other hand, there's evidence that their contents vary from one context of use to another. The challenge is to reconcile these two sets of data. Truth relativists claim that their theory can do so better than contextualism and invariantism. Truth relativists, in effect, use an argument to the best explanation: they present data they claim to be able to handle better than any competing theory2.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,343

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Truth relativism in metaethics.Patrick Denning - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Attitudes and relativism.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):527-544.
No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.
Is it all relative?Stephen Law - 2002 - Think 1 (2):69-82.
Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
Perspectives on possibilities: contextualism, relativism, or what?Kent Bach - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
292 (#97,517)

6 months
9 (#328,796)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Herman Cappelen
University of Hong Kong

Citations of this work

Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):281-338.
Relativism.Maria Baghramian & Adam J. Carter - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Varieties of disagreement and predicates of taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Truth Without Objectivity.Max Kölbel - 2002 - London and New York: Routledge.
Epistemic modals, relativism and assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.
Naming and Asserting.Scott Soames - 2004 - In Zoltan Gendler Szabo, Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 356--382.
Context shifting arguments.Ernie Lepore & Herman Cappelen - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):25–50.

View all 8 references / Add more references