Abstract

Delusions are defined by the DSM-IV as false beliefs about external reality. However, it is unclear whether introspective delusions, namely delusional beliefs that are wrong about one’s own experience, are also possible. One reason to doubt this comes from the fact that delusion and hallucinatory experience seem to go hand in hand, suggesting a strong relationship between the two. Empiricist theories argue that delusions arise from endorsing or explaining an anomalous experience. In this chapter, I will review the existing literature on the relationship between experience and delusional belief, and spell out the consequences for the possibility of introspective delusions. I argue that the current understanding of the relationship between experience and delusional belief leaves space for the possibility of introspective delusions; however, as our methods to access experience independently from introspective reports are still imperfect, it is still controversial whether specific candidates like Anton-Babinski Syndrome might be introspective delusions.