Abstract

Mill was not a naturalist and cannot be understood within the context of the empiricist‐rationalist debate. Mill believed himself to have joined a conversation that was defined directly by Kant, and therefore qualifies as an advocate of Copernican metaphysics. Mill's starting point is the pre‐theoretical, the common sense world of individuals engaging in various practical tasks with the world. The philosophical idealism, which Mill thinks is consonant with common sense, is a rejection of both naturalism and the kind of idealism one finds in Berkeley, Green and Bradley. Like the idealists, he insists upon the distinction between, and the irreducibility of, subjects to objects; but, unlike idealism, the subject is rooted in the pre‐theoretical world of everyday practices. A thing can only be known indirectly by its properties. We discover the Self through its interactions, and a “free” ‘will’ is an inherent property of the self.