The Case for Referential Quantifier Phrases

Philosophia 52 (4):1143-1152 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the referential/attributive distinction that Donnellan introduced for definite descriptions applies to other quantifiers phrases as well. Furthermore, I argue that the referential use of some quantifier phrases is as standard and conventional as the referential use of definite descriptions. This supports the idea that the referential use of some quantifier phrases is a semantic rather than a pragmatic phenomenon.

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2024-10-08

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Antonio Capuano
Auburn University

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References found in this work

Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Reference and Pronominal Descriptions.George M. Wilson - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (7):359.
Reference and incomplete descriptions.Antonio Capuano - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1669-1687.

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