An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth

Synthese 196 (9):3789-3813 (2019)
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system and a corresponding intended interpretation according to which true contradictions are not tolerated. Contradictions are, instead, epistemically understood as conflicting evidence, where evidence for a proposition A is understood as reasons for believing that A is true. The paper defines a paraconsistent and paracomplete natural deduction system, called the Basic Logic of Evidence, and extends it to the Logic of Evidence and Truth. The latter is a logic of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness that is able to express not only preservation of evidence but also preservation of truth. LETj is anti-dialetheist in the sense that, according to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, its consequence relation is trivial in the presence of any true contradiction. Adequate semantics and a decision method are presented for both BLE and LETj, as well as some technical results that fit the intended interpretation.

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Author Profiles

Abilio Rodrigues
Federal University of Minas Gerais
Walter Carnielli
University of Campinas

References found in this work

Natural deduction: a proof-theoretical study.Dag Prawitz - 1965 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
On the theory of inconsistent formal systems.Newton C. A. Costa - 1972 - Recife,: Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Instituto de Matemática.
Paraconsistent Logic: Consistency, Contradiction and Negation.Walter Carnielli & Marcelo Esteban Coniglio - 2016 - Basel, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. Edited by Marcelo Esteban Coniglio.

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