Abstract

In this paper I propose that Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments provides a solution to a well-known problem in contemporary ethical debate, i.e. the incompatibility between classic virtue ethics which is particularistic and informed by an ideal of virtue on the one hand, and modern principle-based ethics which attributes a prominent place to universal rules on the other. Smith acknowledges the incompatibility of these two paradigms. But, in order to preserve the advantages of both kinds of theories, he proposes a third kind of moral theory: This theory can account for ancient-like virtues and judgments sensitive to the particularities of a specific context as well as for a limited set of universal rules, namely the ‘rules of justice’. The clue to this move is a change of the point of view from which moral judgments are assessed to what I call a ‘sympathetic-impartial perspective’. With this original approach Smith succeeds in articulating in a single and coherent theory the apparently irreconcilable elements of ancient and Modern accounts of morality.