Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding

In Stephen Grimm Christoph Baumberger & Sabine Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 272-292 (2017)
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Abstract

In recent work, Mark Alfano and Jennifer Saul have put forward a similar kind of provocative sceptical challenge. Both appeal to recent literature in empirical psychology to show that our judgments across a wide range of cases are riddled with unreliable cognitive heuristics and biases. Likewise, they both conclude that we know a lot less than we have hitherto supposed, at least on standard conceptions of what knowledge involves. It is argued that even if one grants the empirical claims that Saul and Alfano make, the sceptical conclusion that they canvass might not be as dramatic as it first appears. It is further argued, however, that one can reinstate a more dramatic sceptical conclusion by targeting their argument not at knowledge but rather at the distinct epistemic standing of understanding.

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Author Profiles

J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow
Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Self-reflexive cognitive bias.Joshua Mugg & Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-21.
A Routine to Develop Inferencing Skills in Primary School Children.Celso Vieira - 2023 - In Marella A. Mancenido-Bolaños, C. Alvarez-Abarejo & L. Marquez (eds.), Cultivating Reasonableness in Education. Springer. pp. 95-117.
Commentary on Patrick Bondy, “Bias in Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments”.Andrew Aberdein - 2016 - Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18–21, 2016.

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