Consciousness: Explaining the Phenomena

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49:61-85 (2001)
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Abstract

My topic in this chapter is whether phenomenal consciousness can be given a reductive natural explanation. I shall first say something about phenomenal—as opposed to other forms of—consciousness, and highlight what needs explaining. I shall then turn to issues concerning explanation in general, and the explanation of phenomenal consciousness in particular.

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10.1017/s1358246100007116

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original Carruthers, Peter (1998) "Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena". In Carruthers, Peter, Boucher, Jill, [Book Chapter], pp. : Cambridge University Press (1998)
reprint Carruthers, Peter (2001) "Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena". In Walsh, D., Evolution, Naturalism and Mind, pp. 61-85: Cambridge University Press (2001)

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

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