Feminist Approaches to Cognitive Disability

Philosophy Compass 11 (10):541-553 (2016)
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Abstract

This essay explores various philosophical approaches to cognitive disability within feminist philosophy. In doing so, it addresses three broad questions: What positive contributions can feminist philosophy make to the philosophy of cognitive disability? How have feminist philosophers critiqued the presence and absence of cognitive disability in philosophy? And what challenges does cognitive disability pose to feminist philosophy itself? The essay begins with definitions and models of disability and then turns to feminist work on cognitive disability in moral and political philosophy, bioethics, and epistemology. It concludes with some methodological considerations.

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Licia Carlson
Providence College

References found in this work

At the margins of moral personhood.Eva Kittay - 2005 - Ethics 116 (1):100-131.
The Case for Conserving Disability.Rosemarie Garland-Thomson - 2012 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 9 (3):339-355.
Trusting experts and epistemic humility in disability.Anita Ho - 2011 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 4 (2):102-123.

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