Intention Reconsideration in Artificial Agents: a Structured Account

Special Issue of Phil Studies (forthcoming)
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Abstract

An important module in the Belief-Desire-Intention architecture for artificial agents (which builds on Michael Bratman's work in the philosophy of action) focuses on the task of intention reconsideration. The theoretical task is to formulate principles governing when an agent ought to undo a prior committed intention and reopen deliberation. Extant proposals for such a principle, if sufficiently detailed, are either too task-specific or too computationally demanding. I propose that an agent ought to reconsider an intention whenever some incompatible prospect is sufficiently valuable along some dimension that can be assessed at zero or near-zero computational cost.

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reprint Cariani, Fabrizio (forthcoming) "Intention reconsideration in artificial agents: a structured account". Philosophical Studies ():1-24

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Fabrizio Cariani
University of Maryland, College Park

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References found in this work

The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.
.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
Practical reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 431--63.
A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention.Bob Beddor & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):346-378.

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