Kuhn e a racionalidade da escolha científica

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (3):439-458 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration of epistemic authority.The mistake of Kuhn was to emphasize and clarify insufficiently the role of the epistemic authority of experts; his critics failed for ignoring it altogether.

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Eros Carvalho
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul

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References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ways of worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Hassocks [Eng.]: Harvester Press.
The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays.Hilary Putnam - 2002 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.

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