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Mirroring cannot account for understanding action
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):23-24 (2008)
Abstract
Susan Hurley's shared circuits model (SCM) rightly begins in action and progresses through a series of layers; but it fails to reach action understanding because it relies on mirroring as a driving force, draws on heavily criticized theories, and neglects the need for shared experience in our grasp of social understandingOther Versions
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Citations of this work
Enactive processing of the syntax of sign language.Christopher Mole & Graham H. Turner - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):317-332.
Names, Descriptions, and Assertion.Ray Buchanan - 2014 - In Zsu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer. pp. 03-15.
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