On the philosophical motivations for the logics of formal consistency and inconsistency

Abstract

We present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language. We shall defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency are theories of logical consequence of normative and epistemic character. This approach not only allows us to make inferences in the presence of contradictions, but offers a philosophically acceptable account of paraconsistency.

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On the theory of inconsistent formal systems.Newton C. A. da Costa - 1974 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15 (4):497-510.
Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).
Conceptions of truth in intuitionism.Panu Raatikainen - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):131--45.

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