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Unconsciously competing goals can collaborate or compromise as well as win or lose
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):139-140 (2014)
Abstract
This commentary offers a friendly extension of Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) account. Not only do active goals sometimes operate unconsciously to dominate or preempt others, but simultaneously active goals can also collaborate or compromise in shaping behavior. Because neither goal wins complete control of behavior, the result may be that each is only partly satisfied.Author's Profile
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References found in this work
Descartes’ error: Emotion, rationality and the human brain.Antonio Damasio - 1994 - New York: Putnam 352.
Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena.Daryl J. Bem - 1967 - Psychological Review 74 (3):183-200.
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