Abstract

It is undeniable that many mental states are relative to their objects in some way or another. But just what this means has never been clear. If mental states are properties of things, as seems to be the case, then how are they different from other sorts of properties, such as the property of having a certain color or shape? What is the nature of their relation to their objects? Are they reducible to other more basic kinds of relations? In order to address these questions, this dissertation examines discussions of the peculiar relativity of mental objects in Aristotle, Porphyry, Boethius, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In Categories 7 and Metaphysics v.15, Aristotle argues that intentional states are relative in nature, they are always "of" something. The question as to whether they are reducible to other more basic, or more ontologically simple, relatives dominated discussion of Aristotle's theory of relatives from the later Hellenistic period through the later Middle Ages. Writing under the influence of Porphyry, Boethius outlined the two responses to this question which would greatly influence treatments of intentional relatives for the rest of the Middle Ages. He argued that intentional relatives are logically and ontologically resistant to reduction to more basic states, but that nonetheless, a complete account of them would find a way to reduce them. With Boethius's commentary in mind, centuries later, Albert the Great uncovers and develops the host of complicated ontological issues implicit in Aristotle's notion of intentional relatives. In the end he confronts Boethius's choice between reducible and non-reducible relatives and he and opts for the latter. While Albert's contribution to the discussion of intentional relations is seminal, Aquinas understands more than any other philosopher before him just what the ontological implications of intentional relatives are. It is, Aquinas argues, fundamentally a question of how intentional states, broadly construed, refer to their objects in their own unique way. Just what this unique way is, however, Aquinas is unable to say