Predication and the Problem of Universals

Philosophical Papers 30 (2):117-143 (2001)
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Abstract

This paper contrasts the scholastic realisms of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it. Rather, it pertains to which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing existence and reality) but also illuminates why scholastic realism is a position worth fighting for.

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Cathy Legg
Deakin University

References found in this work

”Ostrich Nominalism’ or ”Mirage Realism’?Michael Devitt - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):433-439.

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