Abstract
Conditional egalitarianism is a form of egalitarianism that responds to the levelling-down objection by asserting that equality is intrinsically valuable only when it benefits some individuals. Andrew Mason’s original formulation of conditional egalitarianism faces criticism from Nils Holtug, who proposes a refined formulation that introduces a clause regarding the effects of additional benefits on equality. However, Holtug’s own formulation encounters internal inconsistencies. This paper proposes a positional refinement of Holtug’s conditional egalitarianism, emphasizing the importance of impartiality in evaluating distributions. This refinement incorporates an anonymity condition, ensuring that distributional evaluations remain invariant under permutations of individuals. By emphasizing how the non-instrumental value of equality is conditional on benefiting positions impartially, the proposed positional conditional egalitarianism reconciles egalitarian aims with concerns about inequality-enhancing benefits. This nuanced formulation provides a potential rebuttal to arguments against conditional egalitarianism and suggests a novel approach to distributive justice.
