Abstract

In his earliest work, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* Hume attempts an analysis of the forms of social cooperation and the necessity of the establishment of "rules of justice," concluding that the possibility of establishing a basic normative system requires the previous "artificial" production of reasons for acting. Among human beings, there is no natural reason to carry out acts of justice beyond benevolence, altruism and selfishness. In order to defend this thesis Hume develops an interesting syllogism, a model of analysis, by means of which he refutes contemporary theories. As a result of his treatment, rights, society and the basic schemes of justice necessary for cooperation are the offsprings of the peculiarities of human mind and the species specific necessities in what he, happily for philosophy, called "circumstances of justice," and the interest and principle of sympathy. The author of this paper goes over each of the aspects of his argumentation and makes a brief commentary.