Abstract

Elizabeth Barnes’ new book, Health Problems, seeks to show that health is philosophically distinctive and that no account of “health” can explain its biological, normative, political and phenomenological significance. Barnes argues that we should engage in the project of understanding this concept, but she is skeptical about its feasibility. Her skepticism is nevertheless ameliorative: it seeks to improve our understanding of this concept while accepting that, depending on the context and our purposes, its meaning will shift. In this paper, I examine and respond to two claims that Barnes defends in her book. The first concerns her skepticism toward the possibility of developing an explanatory and extensionally adequate account of health. To assess whether her skepticism is justified, I examine the objections that she raises against existing theories of health and disease. I argue that, while her objections are compelling, they do not justify her skeptical stance. The second concerns the relationship between health and well-being. Barnes argues against two views: that health is constitutive of well-being and that health contributes to well-being. In response to her concerns, I show that – on a richer understanding of “well-being” – these views can accommodate most of her concerns.