Just interactions in value conflicts: The Adversary Argumentation Principle

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (2):149-170 (2012)
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Abstract

This article discusses a procedural, minimalist approach to justice in terms of fair hearing applicable to value conflicts at impasse in politics. This approach may be summarized in the Adversary Argumentation Principle (AAP): the idea that each side in a conflict should be heard. I engage with Stuart Hampshire’s efforts to justify the AAP and argue that those efforts have failed to provide normatively cogent foundations for it. I suggest deriving such foundations from a basic idea of procedural equality (all parties in a conflict should be granted an equal chance to have a say) which all conflicting parties could be thought to endorse. But what happens once all parties have been heard if no agreement is reached? Borrowing a distinction well known to scholars of peace studies, but surprisingly neglected by justice-driven political philosophers, I claim that although the AAP might be inconclusive with regard to resolving a conflict, it is a promising principle for managing value conflicts justly. The AAP is thus considered anew through the lens of conflict management: as a principle of justice to characterize normatively the way conflicting parties should interact for their interaction to be morally justifiable to such parties with a view to changing antagonistic conflict dynamics into cooperative ones

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Citations of this work

Beyond Legitimacy. Can Proceduralism Say Anything Relevant About Justice?Emanuela Ceva - 2012 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (2):183-200.

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References found in this work

The Concept of Law.Hla Hart - 1961 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Political Liberalism.J. Rawls - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (3):596-598.

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