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Characteristic function games with restricted agent interactions: Core-stability and coalition structures
Artificial Intelligence 232 (C):76-113 (2016)
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Citations of this work
Coalitional games induced by matching problems: Complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value.Gianluigi Greco, Francesco Lupia & Francesco Scarcello - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence 278 (C):103180.
A cooperative game-theoretic approach to the social ridesharing problem.Filippo Bistaffa, Alessandro Farinelli, Georgios Chalkiadakis & Sarvapali D. Ramchurn - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence 246 (C):86-117.
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions: Charting the tractability frontier.Yair Zick, Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind & Evangelos Markakis - 2019 - Artificial Intelligence 271 (C):74-97.
Constrained coalition formation on valuation structures: Formal framework, applications, and islands of tractability.Gianluigi Greco & Antonella Guzzo - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence 249 (C):19-46.
Answers set programs for non-transferable utility games: Expressiveness, complexity and applications.Giovanni Amendola, Gianluigi Greco & Pierfrancesco Veltri - 2022 - Artificial Intelligence 302 (C):103606.
References found in this work
Coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees.Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory & Fernando Tohmé - 1999 - Artificial Intelligence 111 (1-2):209-238.
Reasoning about coalitional games.Thomas Ågotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence 173 (1):45-79.
Coalitions among computationally bounded agents.Tuomas W. Sandhlom & Victor R. T. Lesser - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 94 (1-2):99-137.
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set.Gianluigi Greco, Enrico Malizia, Luigi Palopoli & Francesco Scarcello - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (12-13):1877-1910.
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions.Vincent Conitzer & Tuomas Sandholm - 2006 - Artificial Intelligence 170 (6-7):607-619.
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