Eliminating Selves and Persons

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):273-294 (2021)
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Abstract

The Buddhist no-self and no-person revisionary metaphysics aims to produce a better structure that is motivated by the normative goal of eliminating, or at least reducing, suffering. The revised structure, in turn, entails a major reconsideration of our ordinary everyday person-related concerns and practices and interpersonal attitudes, such as moral responsibility, praise and blame, compensation, and social treatment. This essay explores the extent to which we must alter and perhaps discard some of our practical commitments in light of the Buddhist revisionism. I do not argue here that we should change our ordinary practices, concerns, and attitudes, or that the Buddhist metaphysics does succeed in presenting a better structure. Rather, I offer it as an alternative structure that should be considered seriously.

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Monima Chadha
Monash University

Citations of this work

Vows Without a Self.Kevin Berryman, Monima Chadha & Shaun Nichols - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (20):1-20.
Gratitude Without a Self.Monima Chadha & Shaun Nichols - 2023 - Journal of Confucian Philosophy and Culture 40:75-108.
Vows without a self.Kevin Berryman, Monima Chadha & Shaun Nichols - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):42-61.
Self-Control without a Self.Monima Chadha & Shaun Nichols - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):936-953.

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References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5-20.
On the Very idea of a Conceptual Scheme.Donald Davidson - 1984 - In Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-198.
Self, mind, and body.Peter F. Strawson - 1974 - In Peter Frederick Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. London, England: Routledge.

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