The Matrix as Metaphysics

In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 35–54 (2009)
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Abstract

In this chapter, the author says that the standard view of brain‐in‐a‐vat scenario is endorsed by the people who created The Matrix. The author argues that the hypothesis that he is envatted is not a skeptical hypothesis, but a metaphysical hypothesis. That is, it is a hypothesis about the underlying nature of reality. According to the author, the Matrix Hypothesis is equivalent to a version of the following three‐part Metaphysical Hypothesis. First, physical processes are fundamentally computational. Second, our cognitive systems are separate from physical processes, but interact with these processes. Third, physical reality was created by beings outside physical space‐time. The Metaphysical Hypothesis combines the Creation Hypothesis, the Computational Hypothesis, and the Mind‐Body Hypothesis. It also adds a more specific claim: the computational processes underlying physical space‐time were designed by the creators as a computer simulation of a world.

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original Chalmers, David J. (2005) "The matrix as metaphysics". In Grau, Christopher, Philosophers Explore the Matrix, pp. 132: Oxford University Press (2005)

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David Chalmers
New York University

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