What is the dynamical hypothesis?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):633-634 (1998)
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Abstract

Van Gelder's specification of the dynamical hypothesis does not improve on previous notions. All three key attributes of dynamical systems apply to Turing machines and are hence too general. However, when a more restricted definition of a dynamical system is adopted, it becomes clear that the dynamical hypothesis is too underspecified to constitute an interesting cognitive claim.

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The Dynamicist Landscape.David L. Barack - 2023 - Topics in Cognitive Science.

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