Abstract

I argue that, contrary to much current opinion, the views of the later Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson regarding the nature of language--especially what one might call the conditions for the possibility of meaning--are almost always consistent, often complementary, and, on the deepest and most important questions, in fact identical. ;Davidson's clear distinction between meaning and use finds no simple parallel in Wittgenstein's thought. But neither is it the case that Wittgenstein's various dicta apparently equating meaning and use commit him to the view that meaning can be derived from or equated with use in any way which offends against Davidson's distinction. Indeed, much evidence is to be found in Wittgenstein's work of sensitivity to what Davidson calls the Principle of the Autonomy of Meaning--essentially the idea that meaning cannot be derived from the ulterior or non-linguistic purposes of an agent. Neither is Wittgenstein committed to the view that meanings are conventional, hence there is no conflict with Davidson's rejection of that claim. Rather, the need for "customs " plays a role very like that of what Davidson calls the "evidence" for any attribution of meaning. ;The thesis, shared by both Davidson and Wittgenstein, that private language is impossible is discussed at length, as is the idea that a disposition to utter sounds is only intentional and linguistic if it is caused in the "right way," i.e. via a history of agreement in responses and judgements. It is argued that both believe the ultimate basis for meaning lies in pre-epistemic agreement in primitive responses, a fact which locates the nature of semantic facts as inaccessible except via participation in a "form of life." ;Finally, the charge that denial of the possibility of private language commits one to verificationism is shown to be either wrong or to imply so weak a sense of "verificationism" that none of the historically pernicious consequences of that dubious doctrine follow