Regulating Misinformation: Political Irrationality as a Feasibility Constraint

Topoi 43 (5):1389-1404 (2024)
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Abstract

This paper argues that the well-established fact of political irrationality imposes substantial constraints on how governments may combat the threat of political misinformation. Though attempts at regulating misinformation are becoming increasingly popular, both among policymakers and theorists, I intend to show that, for a wide range of anti-misinformation interventions (collectively termed “debunking” and “source labeling”), these attempts ought to be abandoned. My argument relies primarily on the fact that most people process politically-relevant information in biased and motivated ways. Since debunking or factual correction of politically relevant misinformation (as well as source labeling) themselves consist of providing politically-relevant information, they are also very likely to be processed in irrational ways. This makes it extremely difficult to effectively correct people’s political beliefs and political information processing. Since governments should not pursue policies likely to be futile, they should refrain from mandating such interventions. My conclusion is of relevance to considerable literature in digital ethics of misinformation. It shows that many celebrated works in the field ignore political irrationality and fail to consider its implications.

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References found in this work

Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Against Democracy: New Preface.Jason Brennan - 2016 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bullshit in Politics Pays.Adam F. Gibbons - 2024 - Episteme 21 (3):1002-1022.

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