The Ethics and Applications of Nudges

PANDION: The Osprey Journal of Research and Ideas 1 (2) (2020)
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Abstract

Nudging is the idea that people’s decisions should be influenced in predictable, non-coercive ways by making changes to the way that options are presented to them. Central to the debate about nudging is the question of whether it is morally permissible to intentionally nudge others. Libertarian paternalists maintain that this can be the case. In this paper, I present the libertarian paternalistic criteria for the moral permissibility of intentional nudges. Having done this, I motivate two objections. The first one targets the moral permissibility of nudging in general. The second one targets the moral permissibility of only a subset of nudges. After evaluating both of these objections, I conclude that although they are unsuccessful, the evaluation of The Manipulation Objection shows that the libertarian paternalistic criteria for the moral permissibility of intentional nudges fails. I end by suggesting a possible revision to the criteria that avoids the problem, considering its limitations, and providing examples of its applications.

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Valerie Joly Chock
Fordham University

Citations of this work

The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging: Reply to Grundmann.Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (8):36-42.

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References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
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The morality of freedom.J. Raz - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (1):108-109.
Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):331-340.

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