Measuring confirmation

Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461 (1999)
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Abstract

The old evidence problem affects any probabilistic confirmation measure based on comparing pr(H/E) and pr(H). The article argues for the following points: (1) measures based on likelihood ratios also suffer old evidence difficulties; (2) the less-discussed synchronic old evidence problem is, in an important sense, the most acute; (3) prominent attempts to solve or dissolve the synchronic problem fail; (4) a little-discussed variant of the standard measure avoids the problem, in an appealing way; and (5) this measure nevertheless reveals a different problem for probabilistic confirmation measures, a problem that is unlikely to lend itself to formal solution.

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David Christensen
Brown University

Citations of this work

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