Demonstrative concepts without reidentification

Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201 (2006)
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Abstract

Conceptualist accounts of the representational content of perceptual experiences have it that a subject _S_ can experience no object, property, relation, etc., unless _S_ "i# possesses and "ii# exercises concepts for such object, property, or relation. Perceptual experiences, on such a view, represent the world in a way that is conceptual

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10.1007/s11098-004-4509-6

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Philippe Chuard
Southern Methodist University

Citations of this work

Kantian non-conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Nonconceptual mental content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What is at stake in the debate on nonconceptual content?José Luis Bermúdez - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):55–72.
Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content.Robert Hanna - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):323 - 398.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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