Abstract

This dissertation investigates the relationship between skepticism and political theory. It does so by way of an analysis of authors considered to be, each in a different way and to different extents, epistemological and moral skeptics. These authors are Richard Rorty, David Hume, and Friedrich Nietzsche. The introduction explains why skepticism is of philosophical interest, and why there might be a connection between epistemological and moral skepticism on the one hand, and between skepticism in general and political theory on the other. Rorty is anachronistically dealt with in the second chapter before Hume and Nietzsche, because it is argued that one of the main purposes of his version of Pragmatism is to defuse skeptical arguments. Pragmatism and its political implications as Rorty sees them are shown to be not a credible alternative to skepticism. The chapter on Hume contains an analysis of the relationship between skepticism and common life. It is argued that Hume's resort to "nature" is not a satisfactory resolution to skepticism, although Hume's insistence on the simultaneously incredible character of skeptical arguments and their philosophical irrefutability, is taken seriously. This simultaneity is of central importance to the dissertation as a whole. Nietzsche's work is used in such a way as to show that Hume's resort to nature is unsatisfactory. It is also shown that skepticism is a fundamental concern of the Nietzsche of all periods, a point not often acknowledged. Nietzsche's posing of the problem of skepticism is interpreted as a worry over the consequences of nihilism both in a psychological and cultural sense, and perspectivism and the genealogical method are shown to be responses to the nihilistic dangers of an unbounded skepticism. The Conclusion attempts to make explicit the implications for political theory of the resolutions to skepticism which Hume and Nietzsche offer. In particular, it is argued that Hume and Nietzsche suggest ways in which skepticism can be taken seriously, and, simultaneously, moral and political beliefs can be held with conviction and defended forcefully. Thus, the supposed nihilistic consequences of skepticism can be thwarted without denying the philosophical irrefutability of skeptical arguments